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Abstract. Increased attention has lately been given to the re-
silience of critical infrastructure in the context of natural haz-
ards and disasters. The major focus therein is on the sensitiv-
ity of critical infrastructure technologies and their manage-
ment contingencies. However, strikingly little attention has
been given to assessing and mitigating social vulnerabilities
towards the failure of critical infrastructure and to the de-
velopment, design and implementation of minimum supply
standards in situations of major infrastructure failure. Ad-
dressing this gap and contributing to a more integrative per-
spective on critical infrastructure resilience is the objective of
this paper. It asks which role social vulnerability assessments
and minimum supply considerations can, should and do – or
do not – play for the management and governance of criti-
cal infrastructure failure. In its first part, the paper provides a
structured review on achievements and remaining gaps in the
management of critical infrastructure and the understanding
of social vulnerabilities towards disaster-related infrastruc-
ture failures. Special attention is given to the current state
of minimum supply concepts with a regional focus on poli-
cies in Germany and the EU. In its second part, the paper
then responds to the identified gaps by developing a heuristic
model on the linkages of critical infrastructure management,
social vulnerability and minimum supply. This framework
helps to inform a vision of a future research agenda, which
is presented in the paper’s third part. Overall, the analysis
suggests that the assessment of socially differentiated vul-
nerabilities towards critical infrastructure failure needs to be
undertaken more stringently to inform the scientifically and
politically difficult debate about minimum supply standards
and the shared responsibilities for securing them.
1 Why the integration of critical infrastructure, social
vulnerability and minimum supply matters
Critical infrastructure (CI) plays a key role in shaping a so-
ciety’s vulnerability towards natural hazards and the result-
ing risk of disasters (see Grubesic and Matisziw, 2013; Sage
et al., 2015; Pescaroli and Alexander, 2016). Infrastructure
for electricity, water, transport, health and law enforcement,
for example, plays a critical role for the day-to-day func-
tioning of a society. The importance of such infrastructure
becomes particularly evident in situations of disasters and
crises, when CI is prone to fail, thereby causing wider im-
pacts on the society. The vulnerability and/or resilience of CI
itself is therefore increasingly moving into the focus of sci-
entists, risk practitioners and political decision makers (see
Critical 5, 2014, 2015; Herzog and Roth, 2014; McGee et al.,
2014). This attention is further driven by the growing role of
CI resulting from the rising societal dependence on technol-
ogy, the ever-growing connectedness of infrastructure sys-
tems in the age of information technology and the growing
global connectedness of people, production, trade and com-
munication (Collins et al., 2011; Miles, 2015).
However, while increasing attention has lately been given
to assessing the exposure and sensitivity of CIs and the crisis
contingencies in their management (e.g., through so-called
stress tests of nuclear power plants in the European Union
following the Fukushima disaster), it remains highly ques-
tionable whether such a focus sufficiently captures the wider
linkages between CI failure and social vulnerability in a so-
ciety at large. Anecdotal evidence and structured expert dia-
Published by Copernicus Publications on behalf of the European Geosciences Union.
1234 M. Garschagen and S. Sandholz: Minimum supply during critical infrastructure failure
logues1 suggest that risk in relation to CI failure is currently
captured in rather narrow and technocratic ways, focusing
largely on technical parameters of individual infrastructure
branches (e.g., water supply or power generation) whilst fail-
ing to sufficiently capture the wider effects of CI failure on
societal risk and risk cascades (e.g., disruption in water sup-
ply due to electricity blackouts or a standstill of public trans-
portation due to disruptions in ICT technology). Most im-
portantly, however, it seems that the technical discourse on
CI failure does not adequately link into the domain of social
vulnerabilities. It is not well understood which differential
impacts CI failure may have on different parts of the society
(e.g., different age groups, neighborhoods, people with spe-
cial need for care) and how these differential impact patterns
relate to different hazard and crisis scenarios (e.g., a power
blackout during a summer heat wave, affecting the poten-
tial for air conditioning and water supply, vs. a flood-induced
blackout during autumn or winter, affecting issues such as
electric heating).
Social vulnerability studies provide powerful analytical
lenses to approach such questions. Vulnerability thinking is,
at its core, tailored to bring together (hypothetical) hazard
scenarios with the societal predispositions for suffering harm
when affected by such hazards (Blaikie et al., 1994). One
of the core interests in vulnerability studies has therefore al-
ways been to ask whether and how hazards and crises (such
as a compound flood-cum-blackout hazard) have differenti-
ated effects on different groups within society.
For the management of CI failure, the vulnerability per-
spective also begs important scientific, normative and politi-
cal questions with respect to the linkages between CI failure,
social vulnerability and minimum supply: which levels of
minimum supply (e.g., of electricity and water) are needed to
avoid disastrous effects of natural-hazard-induced infrastruc-
ture failure? How are these minimum supply requirements
perceived to differ between social groups (e.g., single elderly
vs. family households or rich vs. poor neighborhoods) as well
as between different other infrastructure elements (e.g., hos-
pitals vs. water treatment plants vs. shopping malls)? Who
ought to be responsible for securing a level of minimum sup-
ply (e.g., state authorities vs. private households)? Such de-
bates are far from being at the core of ongoing discourses,
posing serious questions about preparedness. One example is
the 2016 German Civil Defence Concept (Konzeption Zivile
1For example within the expert round-table discussion on “In-
tegrated Research for Enhancing the Resilience of Critical In-
frastructures through Strategic Assessments and Innovative Plan-
ning Approaches”, sponsored by the German Research Founda-
tion and hosted by the University of Stuttgart on 26–27 Oc-
tober 2016 (http://www.uni-stuttgart.de/ireus/forschung/Initiativen/
index.html), or within the expert meetings during the design phase
of the KIRMIN (Critical Infrastructures Resilience as a Mini-
mum Supply Concept) project (http://ehs.unu.edu/research/critical-
infrastructures-resilience-as-a-minimum), now sponsored by the
German Federal Ministry for Science and Education.
Verteidigung, KZV) requiring Germans to stockpile private
supplies for the case of widespread infrastructure failure. In-
stead of being taken seriously, the plan was widely ridiculed
(within Germany as well as in international media coverage,
such as BBC, 2016; Financial Times, 2016; Spiegel, 2016),
indicating an overreliance on continuous infrastructure pro-
vision, making the German case particularly interesting to
look at.
Against this background, the paper asks which role social
vulnerability assessments and minimum supply considera-
tions can, should and do – or do not – play for the manage-
ment and governance of CI failure. In doing so, the paper an-
alyzes the current scientific debate as well as the situation in
terms of policies and legal provisions in different contexts,
including predominantly the case of Germany. This contri-
bution seeks to explore current gaps and inform a future re-
search agenda on the nexus of CI failure, social vulnerability
and minimum supply.
The paper is structured into six sections. The next section
presents our methods and data for the literature and doc-
ument analysis. Section 3 provides key results. Section 4
builds on the findings to sketch a heuristic model that helps
to conceptually frame the relationships between CI failure,
social vulnerability and minimum supply. Section 5 presents
and debates a future agenda for science and practices. Sec-
tion 6 presents key conclusions.
2 Data sources and methods of analysis
In order to get a more detailed understanding of how science,
practice and policy have been dealing with the intersection of
CI management, social vulnerability reduction and minimum
supply, we conducted a systematic literature and document
review. It covered three main fields of information. First, we
reviewed scientific literature. A structured document search
was conducted in the Scopus database in July 2017, which
captures a wide range of academic literature, including most
peer-reviewed journal articles, book chapters and proceed-
ings of internationally important conferences. We applied
different key word searches in order to identify relevant con-
tributions. In a second step, we did a content analysis of the
abstracts of the resulting documents in order to group the
contributions into three groups: explicitly relevant (i.e., con-
tributions that explicitly speak to the linkages between CI
failure, social vulnerability and minimum supply or at least
two of these elements), implicitly relevant (i.e., contributions
which do not primarily target these linkages, e.g., in their ti-
tles and objectives, but nevertheless address them indirectly)
and not relevant (i.e., contributions shortlisted by the key-
word search but not making relevant statements about the
nexus of interest here). Overall as few as 15 papers were
found directly linked to the core topic of this paper, while
another 79 provided implicit information.
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Figure 1. Scientific publications related to critical infrastructure.
The second body of data captured in the analysis is com-
posed of legal, policy and practice documents, published by
national or international authorities and organizations. Iden-
tified by strategic Google searches and snowball sampling,
the final set of data analyzed in this group contained 73 doc-
uments. Different from the scientific literature, the focus of
these documents is a more applied one, mostly aiming at reg-
ulating or defining different infrastructure standards or at dis-
seminating information on preparedness. In terms of the leg-
islative documents, a regional focus was put on Germany and
the EU since policies could not be assessed for each country
on a global scale and this research was conducted as part
of the research project KIRMIN focusing on a German case
study. The policy and practice documents covered publica-
tions by international, European and German organizations
working in the field of disaster risk reduction and civil pro-
tection (e.g., the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Re-
duction) as well as research councils, consultancies and other
bodies. All documents in both streams (roughly 5500 pages
in total) were then analyzed through an in-depth content anal-
ysis using MaxQDA software. The analysis was guided by
the following question: how are CIs, minimum supply and
social vulnerability to CI failures dealt with in terms of
– definitions and relevant actors with their responsibili-
ties;
– thematic foci and context of application;
– gaps within and between CI, minimum supply and so-
cial vulnerability?
These three categories will guide the structure of the next
chapter.
3 Review results: the role of minimum supply and
social vulnerability in critical infrastructure
discourses
A number of general patterns and trends emerge from the
analysis. The overall number of scientific publications deal-
ing with CI in the context of disaster risk has been rapidly
rising since the early 2000s (Fig. 1), indicating the grow-
ing significance of the topic. The increase can be ascribed
to a mounting recognition of CI protection on national levels
since the mid-1990s. During this time, the US President’s
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP)
was created (Dahlberg et al., 2015). Over the next years sev-
eral other countries followed with their own programs on in-
frastructure protection (Lindovsky, 2014). The review sug-
gests that a major focus has been on CI protection in relation
to terrorist attacks, natural hazards and industrial disasters
(see also Rey, 2013).
3.1 Definitions and actors
Definitions of CI originate almost exclusively from policy
and legal documents. Definitions and sectors of CIs vary be-
tween different countries, although most would comprise en-
ergy, water, food, transport, telecommunications, health, and
banking and finance (Ridley, 2011). In the German context
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CI is defined as “organisational and physical structures and
facilities of such vital importance to a nation’s society and
economy that their failure or degradation would result in
sustained supply shortages, significant disruption of public
safety and security, or other dramatic consequences” (BMI,
2009). A review of the academic papers suggests that defin-
ing CI is not a research topic in itself, as definitions in re-
search documents are either taken from policy, e.g., national
definitions, or adapted from these sources.
Responsibilities for CI and CI protection vary between dif-
ferent countries and even between federal states, as there are
often differences, for instance, with regards to legal and ad-
ministrative provisions. Hence actors and their roles also dif-
fer. In many countries the military or federal relief organiza-
tions play a major role in disaster relief. In the German case
responsibilities for protecting CI are mainly with the Federal
Ministry of the Interior and its subsidiary organizations, par-
ticularly the Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster
Response and the Federal Office for Information Security,
BSI (BSI, 2015b). The primary responsibilities for civil pro-
tection, however, are on the federal state levels (BMI, 2005a).
Each federal state has its own disaster management law while
there are national laws for different aspects of CI such as
water (Bundesregierung, 1970) or food supply (Bundestag,
2017) and IT (BSI, 2015b; Kaschner and Jordan, 2015; Di-
etzsch et al., 2016). In case of a CI failure, e.g., triggered
by natural hazard events such as floods, responsibilities are
with governmental authorities at the affected level, depend-
ing on the scale of the event at either district, federal state or
national (BBK, 2015a).
The responsibilities for CI management in disaster situa-
tions are addressed mainly in policy documents. Across most
contexts and sectors, duties and responsibilities are shared
between governmental authorities and private infrastructure
providers, the latter of which usually take care of the sup-
ply under normal conditions. This is also the case in Ger-
many, where estimates suggest that around 80 % of the CIs
are managed by private operators or state-owned enterprises
(BBK, 2010b), e.g., there are overall around 370 000 op-
erators in the food production and wholesale sector (BSI,
2015a). While in crisis situations these food operators are
still responsible for the continuous supply, government au-
thorities assume responsibility for the distribution, including
the protection of necessary CI (BMI, 2005b; BBK, 2012a, b;
UP-KRITIS, 2014a,b, 2016).
In terms of minimum supply with CI services there is no
universal definition, in either research or policy. If at all,
minimum supply levels are given for selected infrastructures,
such as drinking water. In principle, minimum supply ques-
tions are addressed predominantly by international humani-
tarian relief agencies (e.g., IFRC, 2011; IRP, 2010; UNISDR,
2017) or in (national) policies (e.g., Bundesregierung, 1970;
Bundestag, 2017; EC, 2016b) and to a much lesser extent in
scientific publications.
Interestingly, the discussion of responsibilities for secur-
ing minimum supply levels in times of major CI failure is
almost entirely limited to policy documents. Actors seen as
being responsible for securing minimum supply levels are
mainly those who are also in charge of the regular supply
with the respective CI. Policy documents from different na-
tional and international contexts mention the growing impor-
tance of involving private suppliers in CI protection strate-
gies (e.g., Bundeskanzleramt Österreich, 2015; NATO, 2007;
OECD, 2008). In addition, actors in the field of emergency
response, e.g., civil defence authorities, fire brigades or ac-
tors from healthcare, are typically seen as having a shared
responsibility to supply populations in need. Furthermore,
most policy contexts hold the population partly responsible
for their own basic supply, e.g., in the case of the German
civil defence strategy (BMI, 2016).
Social vulnerability is hardly mentioned in policy doc-
uments dealing with CI failure. Further, it is typically not
defined clearly. Most documents consider supply for “the
population” as a whole in crisis situations instead of dis-
tinguishing between different societal groups with differen-
tiated social vulnerabilities. If used, the notion of vulnerabil-
ity is mostly applied to healthcare contexts or the analysis
of previous outages and their impacts. Scientific literature,
in contrast, is increasingly taking up the topic, mostly based
on disaster case studies that analyze vulnerabilities of differ-
ent societal groups. However, it does not yet do so in a very
structured way, including the treatment of definitions.
3.2 Thematic foci and context of application
While CI in general is not a new topic, most of the research
and policy on the topic was and is focussed on technical as-
pects of infrastructure system and questions of how to main-
tain and restore functionality despite hazards. The vast ma-
jority of scientific papers covered in the review are writ-
ten from a rather technological point of view. They concen-
trate heavily on technological challenges with CI systems
and their management. If challenges beyond such technolog-
ical perspectives are considered, they mostly revolve around
the management of CI, especially in terms of transbound-
ary management as well as public–private constellations (see
NATO, 2007; Smedts, 2010). End users – whether businesses
or households – tend, if mentioned at all, to be treated as
rather passive recipients of CI services and policies or as
small-scale crisis responders in case of CI failure. Yet, they
are typically not seen as key actors in the set-up and design of
the rules that govern CI failure, let alone in minimum supply
standards. Businesses are mostly mentioned in the context of
economic damages in case of CI disruption, while individu-
als or households remain mostly generalized without refer-
ring to specific societal groups with distinct demands.
Policy documents have a strong and growing focus
on resilience-based approaches for CI protection (CEPS,
2010; D-A-CH, 2013; Brasset and Vaughan-Williams, 2015;
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McGee et al., 2014). A growing number of countries either
have adopted a resilience framing to CI over the past years,
e.g., Australia (Australian Government, 2010; Giannopoulos
et al., 2012), Canada and New Zealand (New Zealand Gov-
ernment, 2011; Critical 5, 2014), or show tendencies to in-
tegrate CI aspects into wider resilience debates, e.g., in the
US (Dahlberg et al., 2015), the EU and various European
countries (Brasset and Vaughan-Williams, 2015; UP KRI-
TIS, 2014b). Here CI resilience is almost exclusively seen in
a rather technological perspective with a focus on continuous
provision or timely recovery of CI services even in times of
hazards, crises and disasters (Collins et al., 2011; D-A-C-H,
2013; Ortenzy, 2013; Münzberg et al., 2015). Also the aca-
demic literature has a strong focus on achieving CI resilience
from a technological perspective (Pye et al., 2011; Cimellaro,
2014; Liu et al., 2014; Pregnolato et al., 2016; Shafieezadeh
and Burden, 2014).
Besides CI infrastructure, another focus in policy is on
aspects of civil protection in case of an outage. In the Ger-
man context a huge number of documents from governmen-
tal authorities are available to inform citizens about private
precautionary measures, including the stockpiling of mini-
mum supplies as preparatory measure for potential black-
outs. The 2016 civil defence strategy recommends German
citizens to equip themselves with food for 10 days and 2 L of
potable water for a period of 5 days as well as to keep warm
clothing and blankets in stock to cope with power outages
(BMI, 2016). On the supply side the German water security
law (Wassersicherstellungsgesetz) calculates a vital supply of
15 L of drinking water per day per capita for each citizen, but
75 L per day per bedside for hospitals and healthcare facili-
ties and 150 L per day per bedside for surgery and infection
facilities or respective departments for at least 14 days in case
of crisis (Bundesregierung, 1970). Further, both documents
(BMI, 2016; BBK, 2016c) recommend private stocking of
necessary medical equipment and to prepare for short-term
power outages. However, except for medicine there is no dif-
ferentiation between societal groups. Other publications also
recommend backup generators or other devices to cope with
(longer) power outages (BBK, 2010a, 2015b). For some CIs
there are no regulations to maintain minimum functions, e.g.,
for sewage where no backup generators are required in case
of a power outage (BBK, 2010a).
All of this can be considered as related to minimum
supply, although the term itself is not mentioned. Besides
(national) policy, international humanitarian literature gives
some guidance on minimum standards, although mostly
limited to water, food and healthcare. Among others the
SPHERE handbook (IFRC, 2011) provides guidance on min-
imum supply with water, food and other things in case of dis-
aster. However, it does not mention CIs as such, indicating
a potential missing link between the views of infrastructure
and humanitarian communities on minimum CI supply stan-
dards. Scientific literature in this field seems still scarce.
Some publications in the scientific and policy literature ad-
dress vulnerabilities in relation to CI failures. The case stud-
ies given in the body of literature can be divided into two
main groups. While cyberattacks and ICT failures are men-
tioned in a number of papers, there are hardly any concrete
cases assessed extensively. Concrete case studies of CI fail-
ure are rather limited to disasters induced by natural hazards,
mostly flooding, storms and snow storms. Also, there is a re-
gional focus on cases from developed countries, particularly
in the US. Especially the impacts of hurricanes Katrina (see
Oh et al., 2010a, 2013; Grigg, 2012; Grubesic and Matisziw,
2013; Urlainins et al., 2014; Pescaroli and Kelman, 2017;
Cutter, 2016) and Sandy (see Kelman et al., 2014; Pescaroli
and Alexander, 2016) have been assessed in a number of sci-
entific publications. Economic impacts make for the predom-
inant emphasis in such assessments (e.g., Oh et al., 2010b;
Chopra and Khanna, 2015; Pant et al., 2016; Critical 5, 2015)
as, for example, in the case of the Fukushima event in 2011
(UNISDR, 2017; Urlainis et al., 2014; Pescaroli and Kelman,
2017). Another emphasis is put on the need for improved pre-
paredness in these countries (e.g., Kaneberg et al., 2016). Pa-
pers on disasters in developing countries (e.g., the earthquake
in Haiti) focus on humanitarian impacts from CI failure (e.g.,
Oh et al., 2013; Urlainis et al., 2014; Pescaroli and Kelman,
2017).
Most of the policy documents in the German context stress
the vulnerability of the population at large to CI failures
and stress private prevention measures (e.g., BBK, 2015a, b,
2016b). The review suggests that the only context in which
differential vulnerability within the society is discussed ex-
plicitly is the health sector. In a crisis situation with limited
availability of medical services, the classification and prior-
itization of groups of patients, based on survival rates and
available resources, seems to be widely accepted across dif-
ferent contexts (Rosenbrock and Gerlinger, 2004; Christian
et al., 2014; BSI, 2016). Differences between rural and urban
communities are mentioned in case of emergency water sup-
ply, where scarcely populated rural areas pose bigger chal-
lenges for authorities to provide the statutorily determined
minimum supply (BBK, 2013, 2016a).
Research literature highlights three groups and their vul-
nerability to long-term CI disruptions: the elderly (Urlainis
et al., 2014), people in need of healthcare and low-income
households (e.g., Banks et al., 2016; Cutter, 2016; Kelman
et al., 2014; Pescaroli and Alexander, 2016). In addition, the
place of residence matters; e.g., in a case study in Virginia,
USA, Liu et al. (2015) found urban settlers more vulnera-
ble to impacts from flood and storm surge but rural dwellers
more vulnerable to CI disruptions that occurred due to the
disaster events (see Liu et al., 2015). Vulnerable groups also
often live in places with above-average vulnerability at large
(see Liévanos and Horne, 2017). Other studies linked poverty
to a lack of disaster preparedness, e.g., if healthcare is in any
way weak (see study of Banks et al., 2016, in central Ap-
palachia, USA) or if food security is not given (e.g., Cutter,
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2016, in the case of Hurricane Matthew’s impacts on North
and South Carolina, USA).
However, the vast majority of the reviewed documents fo-
cuses on vulnerabilities of the CIs themselves rather than
the social vulnerabilities to CI failure. If social vulnerabil-
ity is addressed at all, it is mostly only mentioned briefly and
vaguely. A significant gap therefore exists, which applies to
both fields of research and application. Only a few papers
are available which focus on social vulnerability and specif-
ically to minimum supply failure. Even fewer papers exist
with an analysis or debate on minimum supply requirements
and concepts for CI failure.
3.3 Gaps within and between CI, minimum supply and
social vulnerability
Challenges and gaps detected are hardly related to CI “hard-
ware” but focus on lacking or insufficient policies, improv-
ing individual and state preparedness to CI disruptions and
the shortcomings of a limited technological perspective on
CI. Policy challenges, such as the difficulties in coordinating
CI among EU countries and unclear responsibilities, are ad-
dressed in both policy documents (CEPS, 2010; EC, 2006,
2008, 2012, 2013a, 2016a) and research papers (Van Aaken
and Wildhaber, 2015; Kaneberg et al., 2016; Rehak et al.,
2016; Kitagawa et al., 2016), potentially resulting in murky
responsibilities with unclear risk burdens and liability in cri-
sis situations, as Van Aaken and Wildhaber (2015) describe
it for the German context.
Sage et al. (2015) call for a socioecological understand-
ing of infrastructure instead of focusing only on structural
and technological stability. This is in line with Comes (2016)
who claims that although communities are recognized as be-
ing at the heart of resilience, the consideration of individuals
and communities as actors with agency is still surprisingly
weak in the research. Empirical studies on CI resilience are
still rare and “still focus on activities within the boundaries
of the CI” (Labaka et al., 2014, p. 431) and much less on the
“well-being of all citizens through the availability of essen-
tial goods and services” (Ridley, 2011, p. 111), underlining
the demand for more studies on community or societal group
level (Stewart et al., 2009).
Another gap detected in scientific and policy literature is
related to the question how the demands for minimum sup-
ply differ between societal groups. Also scientific papers pro-
vided only few statements on minimum supply of local com-
munities or distinctly vulnerable societal groups. In a study
on healthcare infrastructure in Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, Tan-
zania and Uganda, Hsia et al. (2012) found that less than
65 % of all hospitals have basic infrastructure components
such as reliable sources of water and electricity. This is far
the below the global level of coverage recommended by the
World Health Organization (WHO). Miles et al. (2011) re-
port that in case of a blackout in San Diego, USA, patients
are transported to those healthcare facilities that have backup
generators. Münzberg et al. (2015) discuss the importance of
knowing the critical point in time at which all backup capac-
ity is depleted.
Only a few research papers address the relationship be-
tween CI, (social) vulnerability and supply problems in past
CI failures. However, there was not a single paper for which
this relationship provided the major or explicit emphasis.
Rather, the few documents addressing the relationship did
so in a side note, e.g., mentioning risks for dialysis patients
in need of healthcare facilities with energy backup systems
during 2011 Hurricane Sandy (Kelman et al., 2014; Pescaroli
and Alexander, 2016) and a power outage in San Diego in the
same year (Miles et al., 2014). The San Diego event was par-
ticularly problematic for low-income households that could
not afford backup power and faced problems with the unex-
pected need to facilitate the replacement of food stamp ben-
efits (Miles et al., 2014). Reports on other events describe
a general societal vulnerability to CI failures, e.g., in the case
of the 1998 ice storm in Canada (CEPS, 2010; Chang et al.,
2007), or the severe snow storms in 2005 in Münsterland,
Germany, where affected people were not able to purchase
food in local stores due to power outages (BMI, 2015; BSI,
2015a; Menski and Gardemann, 2008). Hunter et al. (2016)
studied 45 local health departments in 20 US states and found
certain groups to be more vulnerable to power outages, in
particular the elderly, people living in high-rise buildings and
persons dependent on medical devices like home ventilators.
Some papers acknowledge conceptually that social vulner-
abilities interact with CI failures and are likely to amplify
disaster impacts. As a consequence, CI failures with rela-
tively minor impacts in one locality may have major ones in
another place (McGee et al., 2014). These differences and
the potential of individual or community preparedness for
CI failures are, however, addressed by very few papers only.
Grigg (2012) and Moore et al. (2007) claim a culture of cit-
izen and community preparedness in the context of Hurri-
cane Katrina, including preparedness to CI disruptions. Dur-
ing a 2013 snowstorm in Jordan, Sawalha (2014) witnessed
a lack of community cooperation which could have sup-
ported the restoration of basic community services.
Some papers suggest that the individuals’ preparedness to
CI failures is eventually decisive for societal resilience at
large (Petit et al., 2011). CI (minimum) supply in case of
a disaster in the end is a question of ethical choices – who
does receive how much and based on which reasons? Ad-
dressing these questions requires and understanding of CI
systems that goes beyond the purely technical dimensions
(Pye et al., 2011; Sage et al., 2015). However, aspects of fair-
ness of CI supply and related ethical debates are addressed
only in very limited terms, in a few documents of the hu-
manitarian sector (IFRC, 2011; Moodley et al., 2013) but
much less in CI policy (EC, 2016b). In research, this aspect
seems to be a blind spot, calling for increased attention. In the
German context, for instance, growing demand for increased
hospitalization and need for home care calls for studies on
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Figure 2. Summary of concepts, actors and gaps in dealing with critical infrastructure, minimum supply and social vulnerabilities.
the question of how long their emergency supply could be
sustained (BBK, 2012b).
Apart from very few exceptions (policy documents such
as D-A-CH, 2013; BMI, 2016; research papers such as Pye
et al., 2011; Oh et al., 2013; Miles, 2015; Pescaroli and
Alexander, 2016), there is a distinct lack of documents that
discuss CI resilience, minimum supply and social vulnera-
bility in an integrated manner – or even name the three ele-
ments in the same document. These exceptions share a non-
technocratic perspective which addresses societal demands
(see Lauta, 2015; Lievanos and Horne, 2017).
The detected gaps within and between CI, minimum sup-
ply and social vulnerability are summarized in Fig. 2. Par-
ticularly social vulnerabilities to CI failures are hardly dealt
with in CI research and policy. Thus, a significant gap in
research of the vulnerabilities of different social groups to
CI outages as well as related policies was detected. In ad-
dition, potential mutual intensification or reduction of mini-
mum supply and social vulnerabilities is greatly neglected.
To provide a reference guide to the reader, Table 1 lists the
most important policy and research papers in the three fields
of CI resilience, minimum supply and social vulnerability to
CI failure.
4 Framing the relationships between critical
infrastructure, social vulnerability and minimum
supply
Building on the results of the review, Fig. 3 provides a heuris-
tic model for capturing the relationship between CI failure,
minimum supply and social vulnerability. We argue that the
impacts from CI failure are modulated – i.e., amplified and/or
Figure 3. Heuristic model for capturing the relationship between
critical infrastructure failure, minimum supply and social vulnera-
bility.
mediated – by social vulnerability as well as minimum sup-
ply. The latter two are in turn coupled in a functional and
normative relationship. In line with the use in risk and dis-
aster research, vulnerability is understood here as the pre-
disposition of social actors to suffer harm when exposed to
a hazard (Wisner et al., 2004). The immediate hazard can in
this context be the failure of CI supply such as water or elec-
tricity which, in turn, can be triggered by other hazards, for
instance floods, tsunamis, storms or other non-environmental
hazards such as terrorist attacks. The analysis of social vul-
nerability towards CI failure has the potential to inform the
planning and design of minimum supply schemes – and it
should be used to do so in our eyes. In return, a secured min-
imum supply can defuse social vulnerability and therefore
buffer otherwise higher impacts. Given the modulating ef-
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Table 1. List of key references per subcategory (few papers deal with more than one category; these papers are highlighted in bold).
Legal and policy documents Research papers
Critical
infrastructure and
critical infrastructure
resilience
BBK (2008, 2010a,b, 2011, 2012a, 2015a,d,
2016a,b), BMI (2005a,b, 2009, 2011, 2016),
BMJ (1975), Bundeskanzleramt Österreich
(2015), Bundestag (2015), CEPS (2010), BSI
(2004, 2015a–e, 2016), Critical 5 (2014,
2015), EC (1996, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012,
2013b, 2014, 2016a,b), D-A-CH (2013), Di-
etzsch et al. (2016), Eidgenössisches Departe-
ment für Verteidigung, Bevölkerungsschutz und
Sport VBS, Bundesamt für Bevölkerungss-
chutz BABS (2015, 2016), Giannopoulos
et al. (2012), IFRC (2011), Kleb et al. (2015),
McGee et al. (2014), NATO (2007), OECD
(2008), Smeds (2010), UNISDR (2017), UP
Kritis (2014a,b, 2016)
Betts and Sezer (2014), Chang et al. (2007), Chris-
tian et al. (2014), Chopra and Khanna (2015), Chopra
et al. (2016), Cretikos et al. (2007), Dahlberg et al. (2015),
Fu et al. (2014), Ganin et al. (2015), Grigg (2012), Grubesic
and Matisziw (2013), Havlin et al. (2014), Hu et al. (2016),
Janev and Jovanovski (2014), Kaneberg et al. (2016),
Kaschner and Jordan (2015), Kitagawa et al. (2016),
Lauta (2015), Lindovsky (2014), Liu et al. (2014),
López-Silva et al. (2015), Luiijf and Klaver (2005),
Miles et al. (2014), Murray and Grubesic (2012), Oh
et al. (2010a), Palliyaguru et al. (2013), Pant et al. (2016),
Pescaroli and Alexander (2016), Pregnolato et al. (2016),
Rehak et al. (2016), Rey et al. (2013), Ridley (2011), Sage
et al. (2015), Sawalha (2014), Schweizer (2015), Shuang
et al. (2004), Timashew (2015), Urlainis et al. (2014), van
Aaken and Wildhaber (2015), van der Bruggen (2008),
Wang et al. (2013, 2016), Zhan and Yag˘an (2016), Zhao
et al. (2016)
Minimum supply BBK (2011, 2015b–d, 2016c–e),
BMI (2005a, 2016), BMJ (1970, 2017), BSI
(2015a,b), EC (2005, 2013b), Bundeskanzler-
amt Österreich (2015), D-A-CH (2013), IFRC
(2011), Menski and Gardemann (2008)
Banks et al. (2016), Christian et al. (2014), Cutter (2016),
Hunter et al. (2016), Miles (2015), Hsia et al. (2012),
Lievanos and Horne (2017), Liu et al. (2015), Moodley
et al. (2013), Münzberg et al. (2015), Oh et al. (2013),
Pescaroli and Kelman (2017), Pye et al. (2011), Uekusa
and Matthewman (2017)
Social vulnerability
to infrastructure
failures
BBK (2011, 2012a, 2015a, 2016c,d), IFRC
(2011), Menski and Gardemann (2008)
Banks et al. (2016), Hunter et al. (2016), Johansson
et al. (2014), Kaneberg et al. (2016), Kelman et al. (2014),
Liévanos and Horne (2017), Liu et al. (2015), Lui-
ijf and Klaver (2005), Miao and Ding (2015), Miles
et al. (2014), Milliken and Linton (2016), Oh et al. (2010b),
Petit et al. (2011), Pescaroli and Kelman (2017), Pye
et al. (2011), Uekusa and Matthewman (2017), Wang
et al. (2013)
fects of minimum supply and social vulnerability, the result-
ing impacts from CI failure can therefore be higher or lower.
In any case, the impacts can be expected to be differentiated
socially, spatially and functionally.
5 Discussion: a future agenda for science and practice
In combining the gaps identified in the review (Sect. 3) and
the conceptual framing (Sect. 4) we argue that a number of
needs can be identified that can drive future science, practice
and policy agendas.
The literature review revealed that considerable knowl-
edge gaps remain with regards to the ways in which different
parts of the society are vulnerable to the failure of CI ser-
vices, most importantly water and electricity. While vulnera-
bility assessment in the context of environmental hazards has
made great methodological advancements over the past two
decades (Birkmann, 2013), these studies have almost exclu-
sively referred to the direct and immediate influences of en-
vironmental hazards, e.g., how vulnerable households are if
affected immediately by flooding. In addition to this focus,
vulnerability assessment concepts and methods also need to
be applied – and adjusted – to assess the secondary effects
of natural hazard impacts emerging from CI failure. This is
not an easy task given that in many contexts social actors
cannot draw on experiences with respective reference sce-
narios. Estimating one’s own vulnerability, i.e., predisposi-
tion for suffering harm, in case of, for example, an extended
blackout or water shortage might therefore prove difficult. CI
disruptions in the course of natural-hazard-induced disasters
and the (private) preparedness for outages have not been at
the core of vulnerability research so far, although they are
important and are life-saving issues. Not having any experi-
ences with previous outages can exacerbate the vulnerability
due to lack of preparedness, as, for example, one could see in
Germany, where private preparedness and stockpiling advice
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in the 2016 civil defense strategy was not taken seriously be-
cause of, inter alia, the very high reliability of CI.
An additional challenge deserving attention is the poten-
tially fine-gridded differentiation across social groups, space-
and time (following up on authors like Handmer, 2003,
and Barnet et al., 2008, who stressed the need for scale-
and context-specific approaches for vulnerability reduction).
While such differentiation is a common property of vulner-
ability in many contexts, it is particularly challenging in the
context of minimum supply. This is because the infrastruc-
ture behind most services, e.g., electricity and water, is de-
signed for larger system entities. For instance, the social vul-
nerability towards suffering impacts from a sustained black-
out might differ within a single multi-apartment block, e.g.,
comparing an elderly and immobile person with a cardiovas-
cular disease and dependence on electrical medical equip-
ment to a group of young students sharing the apartment next
door. Yet at the same time, the electricity grid cannot deliber-
ately supply at such a high resolution as it functions in much
larger entities, e.g., switching on or off entire neighborhoods
of a city. Questions of timing complicate the situation even
further, as secondary concerns such as power for food pro-
duction facilities can become primary concerns over time in
the case of a prolonged CI failure.
Apart from these rather technical scientific problems, very
important questions emerge at the science–policy interface.
These questions address normative and procedural issues of
distributional justice and responsibility. The review of prac-
tical management contingencies and legal as well as policy
documents (Sect. 3) suggests that practice and policy has
been cautious in defining minimum supply levels for few
CI sectors – however, they hardly differ for different social
groups, regions, secondary infrastructure, etc. While it seems
to be easier to provide numbers for certain sectors, e.g., for
water supply (see above), for other sectors supply levels stay
rather vague or are limited to general statements that the in-
frastructure provision should be restored as soon as possible
after a disruption. Along the same line, practice and policy
have also struggled to define the ways in which minimum
supply is to be prioritized in situations of limited capabilities
and resources, i.e., in crises and disaster situations. Lastly,
the question of who is – and should – be responsible for
the provision of minimum supply remains strikingly open in
many respects and contexts. Most likely a higher resilience
would demand efforts at both ends: the side of the supplier
and the side of the end user. However, how the burden is –
and should be – shared is of surprisingly little societal, polit-
ical and academic debate.
While science can and should play a key role in tackling
these questions, we argue that none of these questions can
and should be resolved in a technocratic manner. Scientific
knowledge of, for instance, sociospatial patterns of vulner-
ability does not automatically lead to “objective” prescrip-
tions or even recommendations for necessary action, prior-
itization and responsibility. These aspects rather need to be
tackled and resolved in a wider societal debate that addresses
the social contract for risk reduction and shifts the decision-
making into the political realm of wider risk governance. In
that sense, the agenda ahead is one of transdisciplinary co-
production and societal debate rather than of risk science and
CI management alone.
6 Conclusions
The analysis presented in this paper has shown that scien-
tists, risk practitioners and policy makers are increasingly
concerned about the links between CI and disasters. Scien-
tific literature, policy documents, legal frameworks and guid-
ance documents for risk reduction practices therefore engage
evermore with the topic of CI resilience and its management
in crises and disaster situations. However, the links drawn
to minimum supply contingencies or the assessment of so-
cially differentiated vulnerability towards CI failure remain
strikingly weak, if not absent in many contexts. The exist-
ing gap between these perspectives is a grave shortcoming
as it inhibits a comprehensive understanding of the risks re-
lated to CI failure and successful disaster risk reduction poli-
cies and practices. The paper therefore put forward a heuris-
tic model that helps to decipher the linkages between CI re-
silience, minimum supply and social vulnerability in an in-
clusive manner, thereby providing guidance for future re-
search agendas and policy as well as practice. However, the
analysis also strongly shows that the main challenges might
not lie within the technological or managerial questions to be
solved, but in the normative, ethical and political questions
around the responsibility for and prioritization of minimum
supply at the fuzzy interface of state organs, private-sector CI
utilities, civil society and affected individuals themselves; the
latter of which are more often than not amongst the weakest,
most vulnerable and resource-poor parts of society. Moving
the discourse on the responsibility for minimum supply and
preventive risk reduction to a stage of more explicit political
and societal debate is therefore urgently needed, particularly
in view of the increasing levels of disaster risk to be expected
in the future.
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